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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 01-3658

PATRICE PHILSON, a/k/a JUSTICE ALLAH
Appellant
v.
JAMES BARBO, Administrator, Northern States Prison; and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Patrice Philson,
Appellant
_______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civ. No. 98-cv-02249 )
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 3, 2003
Before: RENDELL, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
Filed: October 9, 2003
____________
OPINION

WEIS, Circuit Judge.
In 1990, a jury in the Superior Court of New Jersey convicted petitioner
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Philson of murder. After direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings in state court
were unsuccessful, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
the District Court of New Jersey.
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. We
granted a certificate of appealability limiting the issue, however, to whether Philson’s trial
lawyer’s failure to interview certain witnesses constituted an inadequate defense.
The murder occurred about 2:30 a.m. on a street in downtown Newark,
New Jersey. The victim had driven his automobile to the scene to collect some money.
He was accompanied by two teenage girls, Aisha Jones and Erica Dawson. As the victim
returned from his collection errand, he was accosted by three individuals, petitioner
Philson, Hassan Carter and Damian Wise. The victim was shot while resisting an
apparent robbery attempt, and died at the scene.
Philson and Carter were both indicted for the murder, but Carter was
acquitted at trial. Philson retained John Vantuno, a former prosecutor and an experienced
defense attorney, for representation at trial.
Both of the teenage girls, Jones and Dawson, testified that they saw Philson
shoot the victim. In addition, witness Glenn Copeland said that he heard an individual
threaten the victim shortly before the shot was fired. In the courtroom, Copeland
identified Philson as that person.
There were numerous inconsistencies in the evidence at trial. Witnesses
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differed as to whether the shooter wore a brown or green jacket and whether Philson and
Wise had switched jackets. Wise testified that Philson had shot the victim and soon
afterwards they encountered each other in an apartment near the scene occupied by
Carolyn Moore and Loretta Barber. Wise said that Philson made damaging, inculpatory
statements at that time. In their statements to the police, Barber and Moore denied that
Philson and Wise had actually entered their apartment.
One and one-half years after the trial, Cawana Dawson submitted an
affidavit disputing her sister Erica’s alleged prior acquaintanceship with Philson and her
identification of him as the person who had shot the victim.
In his post-trial proceedings, Philson contended that his attorney Vantuno
was ineffective in failing to interview Cawana Dawson and call her as a witness. In
addition, Philson challenged his lawyer’s failure to call Moore and Barber. He asserts
that they would have testified that they had refused him entry into their apartment and,
thus, would have contradicted Wise’s allegations about Philson’s inculpatory statements.
Additionally, another witness, Quintina Holden, was not called. In her
statement to the police she related that she had seen two girls take the coat from the
victim after he was shot. She had not, however, witnessed the actual shooting.
These contentions were raised at the state post-conviction proceeding.
After oral argument and a thorough review of the record, the state judge concluded that
trial counsel had satisfied the minimum standards for effective assistance of counsel. The
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judge concluded that, “[i]t was the large corpus of insurmountable and incontrovertible
evidence presented at trial, which included several eyewitnesses to the murder, which
resulted in the defendant’s conviction and [it] was not due to defense counsel’s
performance.” Further, the judge found that “defense counsel could have reasonably
chosen not to explore the specific avenues of examination proposed by [Philson] for fear
that further inquiry might have exposed information detrimental to the defense.” The
state court’s denial of Philson’s post-conviction relief was affirmed on appeal. The New
Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.
At the conclusion of Vantuno’s testimony and extended argument in the
District Court, the judge announced his decision from the bench. Assessing the record in
accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the district judge stated,
“I don’t believe Vantuno’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness . . . [Even] assuming that it did, certainly the outcome would not have
been different in all likelihood . . ..”
The court observed that Mr. Vantuno strongly denied ever hearing Philson
speak of calling Cawana Dawson as a witness. The judge found, “I do not believe the
name [of Cawana] was given to [Vantuno] by [Philson] in the context of being called as a
defense witness.” Even assuming that Philson was correct in stating that he gave
Cawana’s name to his lawyer, the judge noted that she had another sister who might have
been associated with Philson. In any event, the eyewitness testimony of the two teenage
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girls would not have been weakened to the extent of producing a different result at trial.

With respect to Barber and Moore, the judge noted that their testimony
might have cast doubt on Wise’s statements, but it would not have affected that of the two
girls. Moreover, Vantuno said that he did not call Barber and M oore because their
testimony would have provided the state with evidence of Philson’s flight from the scene
of the crime.
The district judge also discounted any value to the alleged knowledge of
Quintina Holden. She did not see the shooting and her sighting of two girls taking a coat
from the victim as he lay on the street would not have affected Jones and Dawson’s
testimony about the murder.
Our review of state habeas corpus claims is limited by the A.E.D.P.A., 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A petition may not be granted on claims adjudicated on the merits in state
court unless the decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As the
Supreme Court explained “[t]he state court’s application must have been ‘objectively
unreasonable.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2003).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) provides the legal standard
applicable to claims of ineffective counsel. First, counsel’s performance must have been
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deficient and, second, must have prejudiced the defense. As the Court said, “[s]tragetic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation . . .
[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular
decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at
690-91.
The state court followed federal law as articulated in the Strickland
opinion. The issue here, therefore, is whether the decision was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2).
The state judge performed a very thorough review of the trial record after
hearing extensive argument by counsel in the post-conviction proceeding. The only
weakness in the case at that point was the absence of testimony from Vantuno. That
deficiency, however, was remedied in the district court hearing where Mr. Vantuno
testified at length on his conduct of the defense.
We have reviewed this case very carefully and conclude that the District
Court did not err in dismissing the petition. Philson focused his challenge on three areas
where counsel was allegedly ineffective and we will comment on each in turn.
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First, Philson contends that he told Vantuno that Cawana Dawson should
have been called as a witness. Vantuno denied that allegation and the district judge
accepted that disavowal, “in the context of being called as a defense witness.”
Nonetheless, even assuming that Philson’s allegation is correct, we feel that Cawana’s
impeaching testimony would not have been enough to affect the result.
We have examined the affidavit of Cawana Dawson and are inclined to
view it with some skepticism. The affidavit was not filed until one and one-half years
after the conviction without any explanation for the delay. Essentially, it states that the
two teenagers were unsure of the identity of the shooter and whether he wore a brown or
green jacket. That discrepancy, while significant, was already revealed in the statements
given to the police, and was explored during the testimony at trial.
Moreover, the affidavit accused Erica of misstating the fact that she had
known Philson because he “used to go with my sister Cawana.” The affidavit is incorrect
in this respect because at trial Erica did not mention Cawana at all. Rather, it was Aisha
Jones who testified that she had known Philson because he “used to go with Felicia, . . .
Erica’s sister” – not Cawana. A crucial point of the affidavit, therefore, was incorrect and
undermines much of Cawana’s accusations that Erica had lied on the witness stand.
Although Jones’ testimony varied from that which she gave before the Grand Jury, where
she linked Cawana rather than Felicia Dawson with Philson, it was the trial testimony
which Cawana specifically challenged. We conclude that, even if called, Cawana’s
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impeaching testimony would not have affected the result of the trial.

Philson also criticizes the decision not to call Barber and Moore to the
stand. In the course of discovery, Vantuno had read the statements they had given to the
police. Both statements allege that Philson and Wise came to their apartment in the early
morning hours but had been refused entry because of the lateness of the hour. Philson
contends that their testimony would have undermined Wise’s damaging allegations of the
petitioner’s inculpatory statements made in that apartment.
As a matter of trial strategy, Vantuno decided not to call these women as
witnesses because their testimony would have supplied evidence of Philson’s flight.
Giving appropriate deference to counsel’s judgment in light of all the circumstances here,
we cannot say he was ineffective in his strategic decision. Moreover, as the district judge
pointed out, the testimony of these two women “would not have knocked out [Aisha]
Jones and Erica Dawson’s eyewitness testimony.”
The third alleged dereliction of counsel was his failure to call Quintina
Holden. While Ms. Holden did supply police with information about events immediately
following the shooting, she could not furnish any evidence about the perpetrator because
it was the shot that alerted her and caused her to go from her house to the scene. The fact
that she saw two girls take the victim’s coat and flee the scene would not have aided the
defense. That evidence would have merely reflected upon the character of the two
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teenagers. It would not, as the district judge noted, have “undermine[d] the basic
believability of their assertion that they saw petitioner shoot the victim.” According to
the district judge, the allegation that such testimony would weaken their identification of
the shooter “makes no professional sense to me and I don’t buy it both as a lawyer and as
a judge.” We cannot disagree with that assessment.
The trial of this case was marked by a number of inconsistencies in the
testimony of witnesses who were at the scene. These contradictions were explored by
counsel at length and were submitted to the jury that had the duty to resolve them.
After our study of the record, we are satisfied that the district judge
conducted a comprehensive hearing, giving petitioner and his counsel every opportunity
to present the case. We note that the district judge even permitted Philson, acting pro se,
to argue personally in addition to counsel’s comprehensive presentation.
We find no reversible error and, accordingly, the judgment of the District
Court will be affirmed.
______________________________
TO THE CLERK:

Please file the foregoing Opinion.

/s/ Joseph F. Weis, Jr.__
United States Circuit Judge
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